Military Analyst
Yoshihisa Nakamura

About Yoshihisa Nakamura:
Born in Hiroshima Prefecture in 1943. After graduating from the National Defense Academy, he served in the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force and went on to hold roles such as Staff Officer at the Northeastern Army Headquarters, Visiting Professor at Georgia Tech, and Senior Researcher at the National Institute for Defense Studies before retiring. He is the author of works such as The Latest U.S. Military Decision-Making Techniques (Toyo Keizai) and Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA): How “Information” Transforms War (Chuokoron-Shinsha).

From Hardware to Software, War Stands on the Verge of Tremendous Change

Through the robot anime Gundam, I aspired to create a story that examines war in a real, non-nostalgic way, allowing us to feel its impact. In the wake of Gundam, many discussions on war and the nation-state, launched from manga or anime perspectives, have appeared. But those remain fictional. The real problem is that the Japanese people, having a deep aversion to actual war and turning a blind eye to it, lack any real gateway to understanding conflict as it unfolds in reality. We face a situation where some might mistake the kind of “classic warfare” portrayed in Gundam for how modern wars actually play out. Yet, the recent war in Iraq differs markedly from a fictionalized conflict; it’s shown us just how drastically warfare has changed. To explore present-day realities of war and think about them in concrete terms, I’ve invited Yoshihisa Nakamura, who foresaw much of this transformation, to discuss what modern warfare truly looks like.

Nakamura: Before commenting on the Iraq War, let me first talk about the fundamental nature of a military. A military differs from other organizations in two key ways. First, it imposes on its personnel an unlimited responsibility to the state. That is, one must carry out one’s mission regardless of the risk to one’s own life. Second, you do not get to choose your assignment. If the state orders it, you may be tasked with anything from forest preservation to cleaning services. Engaging in combat happens only when the nation goes to war and says, “You are the only ones who can fight for us.” Thus, the military is never exclusively about waging war.

Tomino: After the Vietnam War, it seemed highly unlikely we would ever see a war again with a neat, fixed “front line.” From the perspective of the military’s scope of duties, what you’re describing is obvious, but in practice, that concept always seems to need re-explaining.

Nakamura: The majority of the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) now do look at it that way. In fact, many of those enlisting see noncombat roles, like peacekeeping operations (PKO), as the central reason for joining.

Tomino: Still, I also find today’s mindset somewhat extreme. These are, at heart, armed forces. That fact must be acknowledged. Becoming too deeply attached only to the idea of PKO feels careless to me.

Nakamura: True. Typically, there are three prevailing views on what a military is. The first is that the military exists purely for combat, what we call the “exclusive combat function.” It’s the old-guard viewpoint from earlier eras. In contrast, there is the “combat as core function” idea, which argues that because societal values have changed, you need a kind of buffer zone around the act of combat. After all, killing on the battlefield runs completely counter to social norms, so you need noncombat capabilities—like environmental protection or disaster relief—to gain at least some measure of public acceptance. The current SDF aligns with that second perspective: combat is the main job, and noncombat functions are somewhat secondary. The third view is that both combat and non-combat roles are of equal value in a military organization, and this is the direction in which most of the world’s militaries are now heading. It’s not that one role is always paramount—it’s about shifting priorities as needed. That third view is much easier for younger generations to accept, but older generations tend to resist it.

MILITARY FORCES ARE SHIFTING FROM HARDWARE TO “SOFTWARE-ORIENTED”

Tomino: In principle, politicians should have a clear vision of how we ought to maintain armed forces. Yet, under our so-called pacifist constitution, the SDF ended up treated like an unwanted stepchild for 50 years, growing in a distorted manner. I find it astounding that we’ve maintained a massive force, doing very little with it, and simply preserving its existence. That strikes me as government incompetence.

Nakamura: One main reason for that dysfunction is the absence of adequate laws regarding national emergencies, no comprehensive framework that sets out how to use that capability. With no solid legal foundation, the SDF’s capabilities become mere toys.

Tomino: But if we hastily pass the types of narrow, superficial laws currently under discussion, we risk hobbling the organization. For instance, even if “rear-area support is permitted,” any military operation depends on its support lines—logistics. So it makes no sense to claim that because it’s just support, it isn’t “real” combat. For any large organization, you have to establish a broad, coherent objective and ensure every element can operate organically to meet that goal. And for an armed force, you need precise, well-managed civilian oversight. Yet our politicians still insist, “Japan doesn’t have a military,” sidestepping the entire discussion.

In reality, the SDF is an armed force, fully capable of lethal force, even against its own citizens. If I were an SDF member being treated so dismissively, I might have stormed out of Gotemba in a tank by now (laughs). To avoid that, we need to establish a clear, mutually recognized “contract” between the public and their armed force. Simply put, we need to acknowledge each other’s existence properly. We have reached a point where we must examine war and armed forces with a sense of realism. To me, it’s the civilians who seem particularly short on imagination when it comes to crisis scenarios.

Nakamura: It’s not just civilians. Take the command-level SDF officers who conduct tabletop exercises. Many still assume there’s a definable front line. I’ve been warning since seven or eight years ago that the modern battlefield has no front line, but it’s proven difficult to shift that mindset. They’ve struggled to implement any transformation in their “software,” that is, how they think and plan.

Tomino: That’s precisely where I hoped to direct the conversation today. The classical view of the military, of warfare itself, is so dominated by a “hardware” mindset. Yet, as you point out with the concept of a “military revolution,” actual combat has been shifting increasingly toward a “software-oriented” paradigm. We can’t afford to ignore that. And while organizations need to adapt, the SDF still seems stuck in the old ways.

Nakamura: I agree. The SDF tends to debate and define the military mainly through its hardware. In my view, we should analyze the military primarily through its “software,” and we see that emphasis worldwide now. If hardware refers to weaponry and technology, then software is people and information. Today’s warfare reflects the traits of the information age. Take, for instance, public sensitivity to killing in wartime. Human life is more valued now than at any time in the past. That’s an outcome of our information society, and it heavily influences modern militaries and warfare.

Increasingly, armies must conduct operations that minimize taking human life—both enemy and friendly. Killing civilians is deemed utterly unacceptable. That moral imperative outweighs even the technical advantages of cutting-edge weapons. You can see it in the Iraq War: if we define hardware-based war as using firepower to kill or injure enemy troops, the Iraq conflict diverged somewhat from that. Psychological tactics proved decisive. This idea of targeting “hearts and minds” will only grow more pronounced. War, and the militaries that wage it, are undergoing a major shift from hardware to software.

WITHOUT PUBLIC REALISM, YOU CANNOT CULTIVATE A MEANINGFUL SDF

Tomino: Given these circumstances, why does the SDF still seem out of touch with reality? Even the emergency legislation they talk about treats warfare as though it’s still purely hardware-based. It’s not inconceivable that a terrorist group might own a long-range missile or sneak a nuclear device in a suitcase. These scenarios aren’t science fiction, they’re easily imagined by someone like me, an “anime guy.” So I don’t accept it when officials say, “That was beyond our assumptions.”

Nakamura: Perhaps that’s precisely the role anime can play: to stir the public’s imagination.

Tomino: But people lack a means to integrate those “fantastical images” into a realistic framework. That’s why you see incidents like the Mainichi Shimbun photographer who brought an unexploded submunition home from the battlefield as a “souvenir”(*1). It’s an astonishingly foolish act, but it’s a symbol of where Japan stands: we have that little sense of real danger, the disconnect from reality.

Nakamura: Yes, and it’s the same issue within the SDF. A military is ultimately a mirror of its society. Since the Japanese public lacks crisis awareness and a realistic view of threats, the SDF also fails to cultivate them.

Tomino: Take tanks: in the context of defending the Japanese archipelago, tanks strike me as an almost nonsensical weapon. Maybe for the old Imperial Army it made sense, but why is the modern SDF still fixated on them? I truly can’t understand it.

Nakamura: A prime example of hardware-centric thinking, no doubt. Even worse, though, is the existence of our training grounds. The SDF conducts exercises at the foot of Mount Fuji, which is practically the only wide-open terrain in Japan, hence, the place for tank maneuvers.

Tomino: That’s exactly the sort of issue we need to address head-on if we’re to reshape the idea of “civilian control.” If we fail to do that, the SDF will drift into even greater absurdity.

Nakamura: Ultimately, society itself must transform. The SDF shows no particular drive to change on its own.

Tomino: And we still get people who label any overseas deployment as an act of aggression—ignoring context and making no attempt to think situationally. That’s a grave failing, shared by citizens and politicians alike. We need to start by scrutinizing that mindset.

HUSSEIN MISREAD THE SOFTWARE ASPECT OF THE MILITARY REVOLUTION IN THE IRAQ WAR

Tomino: I don’t believe information alone is so powerful that it can completely control warfare. Even though I agree with your concept of a “military revolution,” as you outline in your book, I can’t bring myself to say information is everything. That said, the Iraq War’s so-called “shock and awe” campaign did exemplify certain revolutionary tactics.

Nakamura: Before the Iraq War, many SDF officers and military experts doubted the idea of a “military revolution” shaped by psychological warfare, where you paralyze the enemy through shock. Few predicted we’d see that in the near future. But watching the Iraq War unfold lessened that skepticism considerably.

Tomino: Still, the results were partly due to the huge gulf in military capability. Had the two sides been evenly matched, we might have seen a more conventional battlefield, yes?

Nakamura: True, in terms of raw combat power, the U.S. had an overwhelming edge. Yet destroying that much of a regime in just three weeks, with under 150 casualties, could never have been accomplished through traditional methods of warfare.

Tomino: If you structure your force according to outdated logic, you get an army like Saddam Hussein’s. In other words, Hussein failed to anticipate how modern war would actually unfold. Likely Kim Jong-il would make the same mistake; so, historically, did the old Japanese Imperial Army. Leaders’ ability to visualize war is key to whether they can succeed militarily.

Nakamura: Precisely. Hussein probably imagined this war as an upgraded version of the Gulf War, still partly an “industrial-era” conflict overlapping with an “information-era” conflict. He seems to have assumed the Iraq War was merely an extension of that. But as events played out, it was entirely different. Take the positioning of his elite troops. To defend Baghdad, he stationed them on the outskirts rather than inside the city, planning a perimeter defense followed by a tactical retreat into Baghdad. Likely he drew lessons from the Gulf War, concluding the biggest reason the Republican Guard failed was that their tanks had moved. Those who stayed put in concealed positions, aided by decoys, survived the air strikes. So in this new war, Saddam created decoy tanks and kept his real ones hidden, confident they could endure. But against an RMA-enabled American military, the trick failed. The U.S. identified both decoys and hidden tanks, destroyed them all, and prevented the Guard from ever retreating to Baghdad.

Tomino: How did the Americans see through the decoys?

Nakamura: Because their intelligence-gathering had evolved dramatically. In the Gulf War, reconnaissance satellites passed overhead about once a day. In the Iraq War, it was hourly. Unmanned aerial vehicles, barely used in the Gulf War, had become fully operational. Even more important than that hardware, though, was the use of Special Forces. They were on the ground early, identifying which targets were critical and reporting precisely where vehicles were concealed. Meanwhile, precision-guided munitions comprised only about eight percent of weapons used in the Gulf War but rose to ninety percent in Iraq. Saddam may have accounted for that, figuring that even if laser-guided bombs had evolved into GPS-guided versions, burying a tank underground would largely defeat them. But the Americans combined Special Forces with precision munitions, illustrating exactly what I mean by a “software triumph.” Concretely, a GPS-guided weapon would strike near the target, and then Special Forces on site used lasers to guide the final approach. As a result, the bombs precisely hit real tanks only. Within days, the Iraqi armor units around Baghdad were essentially wiped out. By the time U.S. forces moved in, the Iraqi side in Baghdad had nearly zero fighting capacity and simply melted away.

Tomino: So they were able to destroy ground forces with great efficiency, but they still didn’t catch bin Laden or Saddam Hussein. Doesn’t that raise fundamental questions about intelligence, whether high-tech “armor” can truly detect the enemy’s presence at a human level? After all, real military action ought to include that dimension. How can they overlook such human factors?

Nakamura: In part, it’s because military analysts often focus solely on hardware. They explain outcomes by saying, “Here’s the new weapon, so here’s the new strategy.” They don’t develop operational tactics from the vantage point of present-day values and ways of thinking.

Tomino: For example, after Baghdad fell, the U.S. Army took no immediate steps to restore public order, which turned out to be a grave problem. Why didn’t they intervene? Because taking a more active role might look like an invasion. Meanwhile, looters cleared out the museums. This is precisely where person-to-person judgment matters: whether you’re formally assigned to security or not, you need to gauge the atmosphere on the ground and respond appropriately. But armed forces are often so wary of how their weapons are perceived that they either overcompensate or undercompensate. Neither is ideal. Being too pure in your aspirations may spawn a host of new problems. We must not overlook that risk.

THE DANGEROUS PITFALL OF SUPERFICIAL ANTI-WAR SENTIMENT

Tomino: The 9/11 terror attacks enabled the rise of the so-called neoconservatives within the U.S., an extremely right-wing faction. Some worry that their new brand of imperialism might spread globally. But I don’t believe any crude, old-style empire could emerge today. America’s ambitions may be fundamentally different from the classic expansionist model. If so, we’ll need a more flexible mindset to serve as a check or a gentle resistance against that possibility, rather than clinging to old notions of nationhood. What matters is our capacity to face reality, how we interpret it, how we act in response, what language we use, and what behavior fosters maturity. We need to think in those terms.

Nakamura: Some suggest that the current U.S. approach could kill one Hussein or bin Laden only to create a hundred more, making the world more unstable. That may be true; a new “Hussein” might appear and further destabilize the region. But as the neocons maintain, there’s also a possibility that democracy takes root and the Middle East moves toward stabilization. We need time to observe carefully and grasp what’s really happening. Regarding the Iraq War, the international community appears deeply split—on one side praising U.S. tactics, on the other strongly opposing war, but it calls for nuanced, long-term analysis.

Tomino: It’s easy to say “No war,” and that line often resonates with the masses. But to have real impact, you need time for intellectual rigor and self-reflection, or you risk veering into the extreme. Antiwar zeal can, ironically, lead to acts of violence. Look at how some anti-whaling activists physically ram whaling ships, for example. That’s the same lack of balance.

WHAT’S NEEDED ISN’T CIVILIAN CONTROL, BUT “SELF-CONTROL”

Tomino: This ties into how we approach the SDF. Rather than using “civilian control” to prevent a coup, we should be helping SDF personnel exercise self-control. In other words, instill in them a sense of pride about being entrusted with weapons. With that, they would refuse any reckless violence and would protect the citizens who bestow that honor upon them.

Nakamura: Honestly, there’s no threat of an SDF coup these days. Over the last two decades or so, the SDF has preferred the public’s indifference. That gives them free rein. They can develop any tactics or training they wish without much interference from politicians, the media, or critics. It’s still “uncharted territory” in Japan, especially in the development and application of “software,” the intangible side of their operations. I can’t think of another occupation that faces so little criticism.

Tomino: That’s likely because there’s no immediate sense of crisis. People assume we’ll never see a real emergency.

Nakamura: But that doesn’t justify complacency. Even in peacetime, a soldier’s true skill lies in anticipating countless scenarios using imagination. Soldiers must study and philosophize more deeply than anyone. Otherwise, they’re useless in battle and risk becoming an isolated institution.

Tomino: The question is, how can personnel living day to day in some remote training ground truly comprehend society? That’s something politicians and citizens should be helping them learn, yet it’s completely overlooked. So we end up with no coherent emergency legislation. And from everything you’ve said, the SDF lacks a realistic perspective. If a real crisis ever arises, I can’t see the organization functioning effectively.

Nakamura: When pressed on how to make the SDF functional, the response is often to accumulate as many top-end weapons as possible, which pulls thinking back toward hardware. In terms of “efficiency” in using today’s weapon systems, the SDF is arguably among the best in the world. But they struggle with creating truly “effective” new systems that fuse advanced technology with human skill.

Tomino: That’s the real-world side of things. The same fundamentals apply whether you’re in combat or in a rescue operation—it’s always person to person. If individuals can’t grasp the nature of their opponents or the needs of the people they’re assisting, even advanced technical prowess is meaningless—like a paper tiger.

Nakamura: Exactly. Since the military revolution, a force’s success hinges increasingly on individual judgment rather than on weapons or troop formations. With widespread information-sharing and flatter organizational structures, personal perception and decision-making—what we might call software—become paramount. The U.S. military excels precisely in that domain.

Tomino: The problem is that many of our middle-aged and older citizens lack the kind of vital intuition—an everyday sense of life and survival—that fosters quick, adaptive thinking. That sensor is dangerously dull. Yet among the younger officer cadets in the Maritime Self-Defense Force, I see some remarkably upstanding individuals. Do they also shoulder the level of responsibility that a real “military professional” must have? Sometimes, the Japanese Coast Guard seems more in tune with real-world conditions, more accustomed to tension on the job. In order to cultivate a comparable sense of situational awareness in the SDF, we need more than abstract crisis theories; we must provide clear lines of sight and support them with real-world thinking.

*(1) Note: In 2003, a Mainichi Shimbun photographer in Iraq as part of a “human shield” group attempted to take home the submunition portion of a cluster bomb as a memento. It exploded at an international airport in Jordan, causing multiple casualties.